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APPLYING TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW PRINCIPLES TO
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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the same time that Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak were building a
prototype computer in a garage in Los Altos, California, Ben Cohen and Jerry
Greenfield were making ice cream in a gas station in Burlington, Vermont.1 Ben &
Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. would eventually become an “iconic social enterprise” in the
United States.2 Despite being organized as a for-profit corporation, Ben & Jerry’s
employs a triple bottom line—profits mixed with social and environmental
missions.3 From 1977 to 2000, Ben & Jerry’s participated in many socially and
environmentally beneficial activities. The company purchased ingredients for its ice
cream from Vermont dairy farmers, sometimes at a premium to support their
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Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak co-founded Apple in 1976. Apple Incorporated (AAPL) News –
Company Information, NYTIMES.COM, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/
apple_computer_inc/index.html?scp=2&sq=apple,%20wozniak,%201976&st=cse (last updated Mar.
29, 2012). Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Inc. was founded in 1978. History, BEN & JERRY’S,
http://www.benjerry.com/company/history/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
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Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise
Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 249 (2010).
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See FRED LAGER, BEN & JERRY’S: THE INSIDE SCOOP 222 (1994).
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industry;4 through its profit-sharing plan, the company disbursed five percent of the
company’s pretax profits to employees as cash bonuses each year;5 the company
established the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation and donated seven and one-half percent of
its pretax profits to the foundation;6 and it partnered with non-profit organizations
to open “scoop shops” for the benefit of youths and young adults facing barriers to
unemployment.7 Many of the Ben & Jerry’s ice cream flavors incorporate ingredients
tied to social causes, such as supporting local and sustainable farms,8 homelessness
prevention,9 and rainforest deforestation.10 Ben & Jerry’s achieved these social and
environmental results while also yielding a profit for its shareholders.11
Ben & Jerry’s is a precursor to the growing social enterprise movement. For
many social enterprises, how the business operates is just as important as what the
business produces. Rather than seek out the cheapest raw materials and labor, many
businesses in the social enterprise movement establish their supply chains to source
sustainable materials and engage in fair trade practices, while paying fair wages and

Id. at 222. Ben & Jerry’s purchased milk from Vermont dairy farmers at a premium after federal
subsidies to the farmers were cut, resulting in a 25% decline in milk prices. Announcing the decision
at a board meeting, Ben Cohen stated that the premium would “come out of ‘our profits, where it
doesn’t belong, and into farmers’ pockets, where it does belong.’”

4

5

Id. at 129.

6

Id. at 126.

7

Id. at 244.

8

Id. at 222; see also, Page & Katz, supra note 2, at 220.

Page & Katz, supra note 2, at 221. Chocolate Fudge Brownie was made with brownies baked at the
Greyston Bakery, a social enterprise based in Yonkers, New York and dedicated to community
renewal by employing homeless and under-employed populations. Id. See also Our Story, GREYSTON
BAKERY, http://www.greystonbakery.com/the-bakery/our-story/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
9

Page & Katz, supra note 2, at 221. “Rainforest Crunch” was made with Brazil nuts harvested by
indigenous populations in the Amazon, providing the population with a source of income. Id.
Additionally, 60% of profits from Rainforest Crunch sales were donated to environmental groups
whose mission is preservation of the Amazon rainforest. See Ben and Jerry and Brazil (BEN), AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY, http://www1.american.edu/ted/ben.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
10

Page & Katz, supra note 2, at 224. Ben & Jerry’s is often criticized for not maximizing profits
enough and therefore becoming stagnant and a target for takeover. Id. at 224-26. However, the
company’s social and environmental efforts were arguably the reason for the company’s success,
attracting consumers to the product. Id. at 224.
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providing fair benefits to their employees.12 This movement has attempted to move
beyond corporate social responsibility13 or “greenwashing,”–i.e., branding one’s
company as a “green” business to attract customers but spending nominal money or
efforts in actually reducing the company’s environmental “footprint.”14 Social
enterprises truly “serve two masters”15—they have a profit motive, but their social
and environmental missions are at the core of their business models.16
In the early 1930s, Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd famously debated in the
pages of the Harvard Law Review whether a for-profit corporation should combine
both social mission and profit motives. Berle argued that “all powers granted to a
corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all
times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest
appears.”17 Responding to Berle, Dodd argued that “there is in fact a growing feeling
not only that business has responsibilities to the community but that our corporate
managers who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for legal
compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill those responsibilities.”18 Dodd

12

See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.

Corporate social responsibility is seen by some as an attempt by firms to improve their reputations
and brands without making sustainable and long-term commitments to producing societal and
environmental change. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent
Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV. 5 (Jan.-Feb. 2011); see also C.
B. Bhattacharya, Corporate Social Responsibility, It’s All About Marketing, FORBES.COM (Nov. 20, 2009,
4:15
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/20/corporate-social-responsibility-leadershipcitizenship-marketing.html.
13

The term “greenwashing” was coined by activist Jay Westerveld in 1986 in response to a hotel’s
grandiose, if not cynical, claims of being environmentally friendly by washing towels somewhat less
frequently than before. See John Sullivan, ‘Greenwashing’ Gets His Goat: Environmental Activist Coined
Famous Term, RECORDONLINE.COM (Aug. 1, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.recordonline.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090801/NEWS/908010329/-1/news56.
14

15

Matthew 6:24.

See Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at 4 (“Shared value is not social responsibility, philanthropy, or
even sustainability, but a new way to achieve economic success. It is not on the margin of what
companies do but at the center.”).

16

17

A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust. 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931).

E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153-54
(1932).
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advanced the notion that the corporation “has a social service as well as a profitmaking function.”19
This article does not take on the broader theoretical debate as to whether
corporations should attempt to pursue both economic and non-economic objectives.
That debate is the topic of other legal scholarship.20 Rather, this article starts from
the premise that the social enterprise movement is here and growing, as indicated by
the number of states that have adopted new corporate forms to house social
enterprise ventures and the number of business schools—both in the United States
and in Europe—that are training business leaders and entrepreneurs in the field of
social enterprise.21
Legislatures are beginning to provide social investors with off-the-shelf
corporate forms to employ for social enterprise. In the last two years, two new
corporate forms were adopted by or proposed in state legislatures across the United
States—the flexible purpose corporation and the benefit corporation.22 The benefit
19

Id. at 1148.

See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (arguing that it is untenable for corporations to
refer to both their social mission and shareholder wealth maximization while making business
decisions). Contra Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders, Changing Metaphors of Corporate
Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993).
20

See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business Judgment
Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 629-32
(2007). The law seems to be lagging behind what is occurring in boardrooms and society. Business
schools across the country have programs and institutes in social enterprise and are graduating the
next generation of corporate executives who believe in creating economic, societal, and environmental
value. See John A. Byrne, Social Entrepreneurship: The Best Schools & Programs, POETS & QUANTS,
http://poetsandquants.com/2010/08/13/social-entrepreneurship-the-best-schools-programs/ (last
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (providing the following examples of business schools with prominent programs
in social entrepreneurship and social enterprise: Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business’s Center
for the Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship, Stanford Graduate School of Business’s Center for
Social Innovation, the Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship at Oxford University’s Said Business
School, Harvard Business School’s Social Enterprise Initiative, and Yale University’s School of
Management’s Program on Social Enterprise). Social enterprise is discussed in the Harvard Business
Review, the leading business magazine, on a regular basis. See, e.g., Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at
4-5.
21

Proponents assert that these corporate forms will hail a new way of doing business. Upon passage
of the Benefit Corporation legislation in Maryland (the first state to adopt it), Andrew Kassoy, the cofounder of B Lab, the non-profit organization that drafted the Benefit Corporation legislation is
22
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corporation was adopted in seven states, including New York and California, and
proposed in four others.23 The flexible purpose corporation was adopted in
California in October 2011 and was introduced into the Indiana legislature in January
2012.24 The proliferation of these new corporate forms has been hailed by many as,
at least, an innovative step forward in business and, at most, a powerful alternative to
corporate greed.25 However, a question remains as to how these new corporate
forms fit into the existing principles of corporate law and corporate governance.
How will traditional corporate law principles be adapted when applied to these new
corporate forms? Can an old dog (corporate law) learn new tricks (social enterprise)?
This article begins the project of examining new corporate forms and how
traditional corporate law principles might be applied to them. The first endeavor of
this project is to examine the fiduciary duty of directors of a flexible purpose
corporation under circumstances that would trigger the Revlon rule.26 Using Revlon as
a proxy allows for examination of the corporate law principles of the “shareholder
wealth maximization norm” and “shareholder primacy” and how these norms might
inform the fiduciary duties of directors of these new corporate forms. In later
quoted as having said, “‘For the first time, we have a market-based solution supporting investors and
entrepreneurs who want to make money and make a difference.’” Maryland First State in Union to Pass
Benefit Corporation Language, CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/
press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.
Likewise, a petition in favor of the Flexible Purpose Corporation legislation claimed that the
“legislation would allow for a new breed of organization where sustainable flourishing of people and
the planet could be achieved in one organization.” R. Todd Johnson, Help Pass California Legislation
that Will Allow Businesses to Do Well and Do Good, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/
help-pass-california-legislation-that-will-allow-businesses-to-do-well-and-do-good (last visited Apr. 8,
2012). There is even some suggestion that these new corporate forms should receive preferential legal
treatment. Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap Charity., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2011, at B1.
The “benefit corporation” has been adopted in California, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, Vermont, and Virginia. Benefit corporation legislation is pending before the legislatures in
Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. See State
by State Legislative Status, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://www.benefitcorp.net/legislation-demo (last
visited Apr. 25, 2012).

23

See The Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011, S.B. 201, 2011 Gen. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); S.B. 62, 117th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2012).

24

25

See generally supra note 22.

26

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, at 182 (Del. 1986).
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articles, this author intends to examine these and other corporate law principles and
their application to social enterprises in different contexts, including other major
transactions like initial public offerings and everyday transactions that could lead to
“mission-drift.”
Beyond examining the fiduciary duties of directors of flexible purpose
corporations, the project has two missions: (i) to inform state courts how they might
interpret corporate law principles in litigation surrounding these new corporate
forms, and (ii) to similarly inform directors, shareholders, and potential investors
about how courts might interpret their rights and duties under state corporate law.
Until (i) corporate law scholars and practitioners propose how traditional corporate
law principles should be applied to social enterprise, and (ii) courts adjudicate issues
facing these new corporate forms to create a body of case law, this author predicts
that social entrepreneurs and social investors will remain wary of using the new
corporate forms for their businesses.
To contribute to this necessary discussion, this article examines the
shareholder wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy through the lens of
corporate acquisitions of social enterprises. As the market for products and services
produced by social enterprises grows, traditional profit-maximizing corporations—
which may have given limited attention to their social or environmental outputs in
the past—will want a piece of this market share and will be able to make a rapid
market entrance by acquiring an established social enterprise.27 Under certain
circumstances, once a social enterprise offers itself for sale, Delaware’s Revlon rule
would impose heightened judicial scrutiny of the transaction and would require the
directors to obtain the best sale price reasonably available, without considering the
social enterprise’s social and environmental efforts.28
The shareholder wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy are
both implicated by the Revlon rule.29 However, these two principles are not

27

See infra Part II.B.

28

See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.

I do not wish to overstate the significance of Revlon. Subsequent Delaware cases have narrowed the
scope of the Revlon rule and some scholars have eschewed its import. Nevertheless, as it stands, the
Revlon rule is the most proscriptive use of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in corporate law.
And to some extent, corporate managers and their general counsel heed its directive. As such, the
Revlon rule presents a useful lens through which to examine the shareholder wealth maximization
29
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synonymous with the Revlon rule.30 Shareholder wealth maximization requires
directors to make decisions based solely on the maximization of shareholder value.31
Shareholder primacy requires directors to advance and prioritize shareholder
interests over non-shareholder interests.32 Together, the two principles dictate that
when bidders make competing offers for control of the corporation, directors will
face heightened judicial scrutiny when a shareholder challenges the proposed or
resulting acquisition.33 Courts will inquire as to whether directors sought the best
value reasonably attainable for the corporation.34
This article argues that if the shareholder wealth maximization norm is
applied to flexible purpose corporations facing a sale or change in control
transaction, it will be applied to the detriment of shareholder primacy. Persons or
entities most likely to invest in flexible purpose corporations—namely, impact and
social investors—do not want shareholder value prioritized over social and
environmental considerations.35 The California flexible purpose corporation law
explicitly rejects the shareholder wealth maximization norm and allows adoption of
charitable purposes or consideration of other constituencies (including the
community, society, and the environment) as “special purposes” of the corporation.36
Thus, for a flexible purpose corporation, shareholders have both economic and noneconomic interests.37

norm and shareholder primacy and how these concepts might be modified to account for the noneconomic interests of shareholders of a flexible purpose corporation.
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184; see generally ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency
Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990).
30

See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 30, at 2265 (“[T]he ‘best interests of the
corporation’ are equated with ‘corporate profit and shareholder gain.’”).

31

32

See id. at 2565-66.

33 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184 (citing the enhanced judicial scrutiny of director conduct in pending
take-over bids).
34

Id. at 182.

See Susan Moran, Some Ways to Get Started as a Social Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, at B5,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/business/smallbusiness/23sbiz.html?pagewanted=all.
35

36

CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(B) (Deering 2012).

37

Id.
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Nonetheless, rejecting the shareholder wealth maximization norm creates an
accountability gap and possibly gives directors unfettered discretion in their decisionmaking.38 To be clear, the California flexible purpose corporation statute does not
address how directors and managers of flexible purpose corporations are to account
for both the economic and non-economic purposes of the firm.39 Moreover, the
flexible purpose corporation statute is permissive and does not require directors to
take into account the special purposes of the corporation.40 Because (i) business
decisions of directors are generally protected by the business judgment rule41 and (ii)
directors are not required to maximize shareholder value or pursue the special
purposes of the corporation, directors are unaccountable to shareholders, and
shareholder primacy is at risk.42 This article discusses and evaluates other potential
accountability mechanisms, including a heightened standard of review for directors’
decisions affecting the sale or change of control of a flexible purpose corporation.
Part II of this article proceeds with an introduction to social enterprise and
its potential to attract large corporate acquirers. Part III presents the shareholder
wealth maximization norm and the Revlon rule. Part IV examines the flexible
purpose corporation. Part V applies the concept of shareholder primacy to reject the
shareholder wealth maximization norm for flexible purpose corporations engaging in
a sale or change of control. Part VI considers the gap in directors’ accountability left
by rejection of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and poses potential
solutions to fill the gap, and Part VII offers closing propositions.
II.

THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SPECTRUM
A. Defining Social Enterprise

Many terms are used to refer to organizations that blend profit motive with
social and environmental missions, including “shared value,”43 “social business,”44
38

See infra Part VI.A.

39

CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(C) (Deering 2012).

40

Id.

41

See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55, 60 (Del. 2006).

42

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(C) (Deering 2012).

Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at 6 (defining “shared value” as “policies and operating practices
that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and
social conditions in the communities in which it operates”).

43
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“social entrepreneurship,”45 “social enterprise,”46 “mission-driven” businesses,47
“double bottom line” businesses,48 and “triple bottom line” businesses.49 Each term
varies depending on the person or entity defining the concept, and the mainstream

44 Muhammad Yunus, the founder and managing director of Grameen Bank uses the term “social
business” to describe a business that is either (1) a “non-loss, non-dividend company devoted to
solving a social problem and owned by investors who reinvest all profits in expanding and improving
the business” or (2) a “profit-making company owned by poor people, either directly or through a
trust that is dedicated to a predefined social cause,” particularly improving the owners’ economic
positions. MUHAMMAD YUNUS WITH KARL WEBER, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND
OF CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter YUNUS,
BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS]. The objective of a social business is to create social benefits for
marginalized populations. See id. at 2. A social business aims for “financial and economic
sustainability” or “to recover its full costs,” distinguishing it from charities, which rely on donations to
cover losses. See id. at 3; MUHAMMAD YUNUS WITH KARL WEBER, CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT
POVERTY: SOCIAL BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 22 (2007) [hereinafter YUNUS,
CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY] (claiming that a social business is not a charity but is a
business that must “recover its full costs while achieving its social objectives”).

YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 4 (“’Social entrepreneurship’ relates to a
person. It describes an initiative of social consequences created by an entrepreneur with a social
vision. This initiative may be a non-economic initiative, a charity initiative, or a business initiative
with or without personal profit.”). According to the Skoll Foundation, one of the leading foundations
that funds social entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurs are “[s]ociety’s change agents: creators of
innovations that disrupt the status quo and transform our world for the better.” About, SKOLL
FOUND., http://www.skollfoundation.org/about (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). Another leading
foundation, the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, states that “[s]ocial entrepreneurship
is . . . [a]bout applying practical, innovative and sustainable approaches to benefit society in general,
with an emphasis on those who are marginalized and poor.” What is a Social Entrepreneur?, SCHWAB
FOUND. FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP, http://www.schwabfound.org/sf/SocialEntrepreneurs/
Whatisasocialentrepreneur/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
45

Rosemary E. Fei, A Guide to Social Enterprise Vehicles, 22 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 37, 37 (2011) (“In the
United States, [social enterprise] broadly encompasses enterprises that seek to achieve their primary
social or environmental missions using business methods . . . . Social enterprise is about change and
innovation . . . .”).

46

MARC LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 7 (2011)
(“‘[S]ocial enterprise’ will refer to any business model that, to a significant degree, has a missiondriven motive. This mission-driven motive may be exclusive of a profit motive or blended with one.
The mission-driven motive may be primary and the profit motive may be secondary, or vice versa.”).

47

48

YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 12.

49

Id.
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media often uses these terms interchangeably.50 However, scholars and practitioners
alike distinguish between them.51 Theoretically, the organizational spectrum has two
extremes. On one end of the spectrum are organizations that pursue social and
environmental missions and eschew profit motives, such as non-profit
organizations.52 On the other end of the spectrum are organizations that focus solely
on profit-maximization and disregard social and environmental missions—these
might be called profit-maximizing businesses.53 Somewhere between these two
extremes lie enterprises that blend profit motives and social missions.54
To those whose interests lie closer to the end of the spectrum that prioritizes
social and environmental values, “social enterprise” means using business techniques
to advance socially and environmentally beneficial goals.55 According to Social

See J. Gregeory Dees, The Meaning of “Social Entrepreneurship,” at 1 (May 30, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/dees_sedef.pdf (“Many associate
social entrepreneurship exclusively with not-for-profit organizations starting for-profit or earnedincome ventures. Others use it to describe anyone who starts a not-for-profit organization. Still
others use it to refer to business owners who integrate social responsibility into their operations.”); see
also Fei, supra note 46, at 37 (“Depending on who is attempting to define the term, varying emphasis
may be given, for example, to whether a social enterprise operates for private profit and, if so, to what
degree.”). The Social Enterprise Alliance, a non-profit membership association that promotes the
work of social enterprises, regards “social entrepreneurship” (as distinct from “social enterprise”) as
all forms of socially beneficial business activities, including corporate social responsibility. What is
Social Enterprise?, SOCIAL ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise
(last visited Mar. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Social Enterprise].
50

See, e.g., YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 3-4 (“Terms such as ‘social
enterprise,’ ‘social entrepreneurship,’ and many others are frequently used in literature devoted to
efforts to address problems such as poverty. Although these terms are used in varying ways by
different writers, they are generally used to refer to subconcepts within either the profit-making world
or the traditional world of non-profit organizations. Thus, they are not the same as what I call social
business.” (emphasis in original)).
51

52 See id. at 1 (suggesting that two differing ends of the spectrum include “a traditional profitmaximizing business (which describes practically all private companies in the world today)” and “a
not-for-profit organization (which relies on charitable or philanthropic donations)”).
53

See id.

I speak of mission and motive here, rather than “non-profit” and “for-profit” because a social
enterprise can organize as a non-profit public benefit corporation or as a for-profit corporation.

54

55 See Social Enterprise, supra note 50 (defining “social enterprise” as “an organization or venture that
achieves its primary social or environmental mission using business methods”). See also LANE, supra
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Enterprise Alliance, Inc., a non-profit organization that promotes the goals of social
enterprise, a social enterprise must “directly address social needs through [its]
products and services or through the numbers of disadvantaged people [it]
employ[s].”56 For others, social enterprise means “blended enterprise” or double or
triple bottom line businesses—i.e., “entit[ies] that intend[] to pursue profits and
social good both in tandem and by making considered choices to pursue one over
the other.”57 Similarly, “social venture” has been defined as “the combination of
mission and venture, in varying degrees.”58
There are also those who promote “shared value” and “blended value”—i.e.,
“policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company
while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the
communities in which it operates.”59 Under the concept of shared value or blended
value, there is no choice between profits and social value; both are pursued
simultaneously to optimize economic and social value, with social and environmental
benefits measured relative to costs.60 In advocating a blended value approach, Jed
Emerson, founder of one of the first U.S.-based venture philanthropy firms,
note 47, at 4 (stating that “a social enterprise can be viewed as one not motivated by profit, in that any
profit motive takes a back seat to a mission centered on curing an acute social malady”).
56

Social Enterprise, supra note 50 (emphasis in original).

Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105
(2010).
57

Keith B. Artin, Aligning Mission and a Social Venture, in SUCCEEDING AT SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: HARDWON LESSONS FOR NONPROFITS AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 4 (2010); see also Moran, supra note
35, at B5 (“At a social venture, the social mission is expected to be at least as important as the moneymaking mission.”).
58

59

Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at 6.

Id. at 6-7. This article illustrates the meaning of shared value by contrasting it with the fair trade
movement through which farmers are paid premiums for their crops. Id. at 5. Under the principle of
shared value, social value is not optimized through payment of premiums because the cost is equal to
the benefits and resources are simply redistributed. Id. Instead, shared value:

60

focuses on improving growing techniques and strengthening the local cluster of
supporting suppliers and other institutions in order to increase the farmers’
efficiency, yields, product quality, and sustainability[,] . . . lead[ing] to a bigger pie of
revenue and profits that benefits both farmers and the companies that buy from
them.
Id.
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observed that “all organizations, whether for-profit or not, create value that consists
of economic, social and environmental value components—and that investors
(whether market-rate, charitable or some mix of the two) simultaneously generate all
three forms of value through providing capital to organizations.”61 Because value
creation necessarily consists of a blend of social, environmental, and financial values,
the blended value approach attempts to maximize the impact of total value rather
than any one component that is arguably indivisible from the others.62
High profile examples of companies that can be included in the spectrum of
social enterprise include TOMS Shoes, Inc.—for every pair of TOMS shoes a
customer buys, TOMS donates a pair to a child in a developing country in order to
alleviate foot diseases caused by parasites in the soil;63 Stonyfield—a yogurt company
dedicated to sustainable agricultural practices;64 Better World Books—an online
Jed Emerson, About: Blended Value, BLENDEDVALUE.ORG, http://www.blendedvalue.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
61

See id. (“The outcome of all this activity is value creation and that value is itself non-divisible and,
therefore, a blend of [economic, social, and environmental value].” See generally Jed Emerson, Moving
Ahead Together, Implications of Blended Value for the Future of Our Work, BLENDEDVALUE.ORG (May 13,
2004), http://www.blendedvalue.org/media/pdf-moving-ahead-together.pdf.
62

One for One, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/our-movement/movement-one-for-one (last
visited Mar. 10, 2012) [hereinafter TOMS SHOES]. TOMS Shoes, Inc. is the brainchild of Blake
Mycoskie, who came up with the idea for the shoe company on a vacation to Argentina in 2006.
BLAKE MYCOSKIE, START SOMETHING THAT MATTERS 3, 4-6 (2011). There are at least two other
shoe companies that have a one-to-one donation model like TOMS, including Groobs Shoes and
TWINS for Peace. Our Crusade, GROOBS, http://www.groobs.com/index.cfm/page/OurCrusade/
our-crusade.cfm (last visted Mar. 10, 2012) (“[B]uying a pair of GROOBS is also giving a new pair of
shoes to someone who is homeless in your city and may not own a pair of shoes or a child that has
never worn a pair of shoes in their life and has an enormous chance of contracting intestinal worms
by not wearing a simple pair of shoes.”);
Our Philosophy, TWINS FOR PEACE,
http://www.twinsforpeace.com/philosophie/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (discussing the company’s
donation of “medical supplies, school tuition, books and supplies to children living in impoverished
countries,” as well as the one-for-one shoe model).
63

Meg Cadoux Hirshberg, The Full Story, STONYFIELD ORGANIC, http://www.stonyfield.com/aboutus/our-story-nutshell/full-story (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). Started in the late 1970s as a non-profit
organization to teach sustainable agricultural practices, Stonyfield is now a for-profit “green” business.
It has maintained its dedication to an environmental mission by purchasing its milk from organic
family farms, using sustainable packaging, reducing its environmental impact and use of natural
resources in production and transportation of its products, and donating 10% of its profits to
environmental causes. Id.

64
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bookseller that generates funding for non-profit literacy programs by selling books
reclaimed from college campuses and libraries;65 H.U.M.A.N. Healthy Vending—a
company that fights obesity by making healthy food accessible through re-designed
vending machines placed in schools and offices, often at little cost to the location
provider;66 and Greyston Bakery—a Yonkers, New York-based bakery that dedicates
itself to community renewal by providing sustainable employment—including fair
wages and benefits—to low-income community members and reinvesting all profits
in the Greyston Foundation, which provides jobs, job training, affordable housing,
youth services, and health care to the Yonkers community.67 Each of these social
enterprises arguably engages in more than just corporate social responsibility,68 cause
marketing, or “greenwashing.”69
B. Potential for Acquisitions
A social enterprise with steady or high growth (or the potential for such)
might face a sale or change in control transaction, either because the company’s
stock price reflects its pursuit of a social or environmental mission or because profitmaximizing businesses want a piece of the market share for conscientious

Triple Bottom Line: Social Enterprise, BETTERWORLDBOOKS, http://www.betterworldbooks.com/
info.aspx?f=bottomlines (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). Better World Books—started by two friends
who began selling their old textbooks online after they graduated from college—now resells books
that would otherwise be thrown away and directs a sizable portion of the books and profits towards
literacy initiatives. Id. The company espouses a “triple bottom line,” explicitly placing their social and
environmental missions on par with their economic objectives. See id.
65

FAQs: Finances?, HEALTHY VENDING, http://www.healthyvending.com/faqs/locations/vendingmachine-financing (last visited Mar. 28, 2012); The h.u.m.a.n. Mission: Helping Unite Man and Nutrition
(h.u.m.a.n.), HEALTHY VENDING, http://www.healthyvending.com/aboutus#2 (last visited Mar. 10,
2012).
66

Our Story, supra note 9 (Greyston Bakery’s motto is, “We don’t hire people to bake brownies. We
bake brownies to hire people.”); Greyston Bakery Becomes the First Benefit Corporation in the State of New
York, CSR-WIRE (Feb. 16, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/33777-GreystonBakery-Becomes-the-First-Benefit-Corporation-in-the-State-of-New-York (“Greyston Bakery became
the first social enterprise to register as a Benefit Corporation in the State of New York.”).

67

See Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at 16 (stating that “[corporate social responsibility] programs
focus mostly on reputation and have only a limited connection to the business, making them hard to
justify and maintain over the long run”); see also Bhattacharya, supra note 13.
68

69

See Sullivan, supra note 14.
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consumers.70 That is, a social enterprise may face a change in control transaction
precisely because company earnings are not its only bottom line.71 The social
enterprise may forgo profits to achieve a social or environmental mission.72 For
example, TOMS Shoes has given away over one million pairs of shoes.73 The
management of TOMS Shoes made a strategic decision to start manufacturing
operations in Ethiopia and Argentina as part of its social objective to create jobs in
the areas where it donates shoes.74 Some would argue that choosing to provide jobs
where it provides charity rather than ship shoes from China, where it also has
manufacturing operations, could come at the expense of company earnings if the
labor and raw materials were more cheaply available in China.75 The social
“Profit-maximizing business,” or “PMB,” is a term used by Muhammad Yunus to describe
companies that seek profits, even if the company also has social or environmental missions. See
YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 1.

70

See generally Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties And Recent Developments
In Corporate Transactions, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2009: CURRENT OFFENSIVE &
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS (2009).
71

72

Id.

73

See TOMS SHOES, supra note 63.

See TOMS Shoes, SHOE DIGEST (July 5, 2011), http://www.shoedigest.com/donate-shoes/tomsshoes.

74

TOMS is privately-held and its financial statements and other corporate information are not
publicly available, so it is not clear whether TOMS factories in Ethiopia and Argentina hurt TOMS’
financial bottom line. But see KEVIN LYNCH & JULIUS WALLS, JR., MISSION INC.: THE
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, 113-15 (2009) (noting that traditional
understanding of business costs dictate that:
75

doing the right thing squeezes your bottom line. Do you want to use
environmentally safe, fairly traded, humanely produced raw materials? Your costs of
goods will go up. Pay your employees a living wage, provide first class benefits, work
reasonable hours? There goes your labor budget. Produce in America, or closely
monitor human-rights policies of offshore manufacturers? Too expensive; say good-bye
to shelf space at Wal-Mart. Give money to the community to encourage employee
volunteerism? Less profit to reinvest in growth. Operate from green, built to last
facilities? More up front costs.).
However, Lynch and Walls note that this traditional thinking does not take into account the real costs
of business—companies do not bear the full costs of the products they sell when the social and
environmental detriments caused by their profit-maximizing activities are externalized and kept off
corporate financial statements.
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enterprise’s earnings affect its stock price and entice a buyer, either hostile or
friendly, in an attempt to achieve greater earnings and higher stock prices for the
company.76
Many would argue, however, that the financial success of a social enterprise
may be because of—and not in spite of—its social and environmental mission, since
many consumers prefer socially responsible and environmentally sustainable
products and services.77 Indeed, it seems more likely that a social enterprise will be
targeted by bidders because the target has access to a new and growing market of
socially responsible business; profit-maximizing businesses will want to expand into
that market by acquiring an established participant rather than starting their own
brands.78 Such an acquisition leads to an immediate immersion in the market,
marked by the legitimacy of the target social enterprise.79 Such was the case of
Tom’s of Maine, Inc. (purchased by Colgate-Palmolive Company),80 Burt’s Bees, Inc.

See Block, supra note 71, at 20 (noting that “companies whose stock prices fall may become prime
acquisition or leveraged buyout candidates because of their corresponding lack of liquidity and their
inability to provide their creative people and senior executives with necessary stock-based
incentives”).

76

77

YUNUS, CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY, supra note 44, at 26.

78

See generally Block, supra note 71.

As an example, consider the following statement in Colgate-Palmolive Co.’s 2008 annual report:
“Tom’s of Maine gave Colgate the opportunity to enter the fast-growing health and specialty trade
channel in the U.S. where Tom’s of Maine toothpaste and deodorants are market leaders.” ColgatePalmolive Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Colgate Annual Report]. In a
Clorox press release announcing the purchase of Burt’s Bees, Clorox’s Chairman and CEO Donald R.
Knauss announced, “‘This acquisition allows us to enter a growing market that’s consistent with
consumer megatrends.’” Press Release, Clorox Co., Clorox to Acquire Burt’s Bees; Expands into
Fast-Growing Natural Personal Care (Oct. 31, 2007) (on file with author). Clorox does, however, also
have its own brand of natural cleaning products called Green Works. Green Works: our name says it all!,
GREEN WORKS, http://www.greenworkscleaners.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
79

See Colgate Annual Report, supra note 79. Tom’s of Maine, Inc. was a family-owned company until
2006 when Colgate-Palmolive Company purchased 84% of its shares for approximately $100 million.
Id.
Our Company:
Heritage, TOM’S OF MAINE, http://www.tomsofmaine.com/businesspractices/heritage/early-history (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). Tom’s of Maine now operates as an
independently run division of Colgate. See Colgate Expands Reach of Quirky Toothpaste, USA TODAY
(Mar. 21, 2006, 11:47 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2006-03-21-colgatetoms_x.htm. Note that Tom’s of Maine, Inc. has no affiliation with TOMS Shoes, Inc.
80
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(purchased by The Clorox Company),81 and Ben & Jerry’s (purchased by Unilever).82
As one mergers and acquisitions lawyer notes, “it might just be cheaper to buy than
build.”83
Mergers within the same industry can also reduce operating costs by
eliminating duplicative employees, plants, and offices, reducing competition within
the market.84 Once a merger is announced, other companies within the industry are
likely to make their own offers in order to remain competitive:
As markets become dominated by fewer and fewer companies, these
companies that fail to grow not only may wind up less competitive
on a global scale and unprepared to deal with changing technologies
or develop new ones, but also may find their strategic options limited
if they miss the opportunity to gain a significant market share by
merging with a preferred partner.85
As more and more social enterprises are established, there is a real possibility that
larger, profit-maximizing corporations will target them in order to gain these
advantages. How will corporate law principles be applied to handle these
acquisitions? What obligation, if any, do the target boards have under traditional
corporate law principles to ensure that social enterprises’ missions survive?
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
NORM ON SOCIAL ENTERPRISES
A. Ben & Jerry’s Revisited

When directors of a social enterprise start down the path of a change in
control transaction or sale, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is implicated.
Generally, the shareholder wealth maximization norm stands for the premise that
directors’ decision-making should be grounded in and directed at maximizing the
wealth of the corporation’s shareholders, who are the residual claimants on the
The Clorox Company purchased 100% of the stock of Burt’s Bees in October 2007 for
approximately $925 million. The Clorox Company, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 31, 2007).
81

82

See generally Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEFM 14A) (July 6, 2000).

83

Block, supra note 71, at 20.

84

Id. at 19-20.

85

Id. at 20.
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corporation’s assets and earnings.86 Under Delaware law, the Revlon rule embraces
the shareholder wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy for change in
control and sale transactions by requiring directors to focus solely on the firm’s
intrinsic value to the exclusion of other considerations, such as employees, the
environment, and other constituencies (although directors are still given “wide
latitude to customize a merger or sales process in the best interests of a target
company and its stockholders”).87
The sale of Ben & Jerry’s illustrates this issue. In 2000, founders Ben Cohen
and Jerry Greenfield, who controlled Ben & Jerry’s board of directors along with
director Jeff Furman, allowed Unilever to purchase the corporation, presumably
under threat of director liability should they not sell the company to the highest
bidder.88 Stakeholders and scholars alike lamented the takeover of a mission-driven
hometown company by a profit-driven international conglomerate.89 Debate
surrounds (i) whether Cohen and Greenfield had to sell to Unilever as the highest
bidder under the shareholder wealth maximization norm, or (ii) whether Cohen and
Greenfield used fiduciary duties as a “scapegoat” to hide their changed priorities and
effectively “sold out.”90 As a Vermont corporation, Ben & Jerry’s board of directors
86

See infra Part III.B.

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (1986); William Savitt
et al., Delaware Court of Chancery Refines Rules for Mixed-Consideration Mergers, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (June 13, 2011, 9:38 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2011/06/13/delaware-court-of-chancery-refines-rules-for-mixed-considerationmergers/#more-18328.
87

Page & Katz, supra note 2, at 211-12, 228-29 (“[A] person with knowledge of the bidding observed,
‘The board felt they had no choice but to let all three groups put their best offers on the table . . . .
We think it’s horrible that a company has no choice but to sell to the highest bidder or get sued.’”).
88

See id. at 212, 230. See generally Jenny Kassan, Protecting Your Mission: Legal Tools to Keep Your Company
on the Righteous Path, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/
ebx/protecting-your-mission/Content?oid=1623624.
89

See Page & Katz, supra note 2, at 226 n.122, 230. Professors Robert A. Katz and Anthony Page
vigorously deny that the founders were forced to sell the company; Katz and Page claim that
corporate laws concerning takeovers were used by Cohen and Greenfield as a “scapegoat” to hide the
fact that their priorities had changed. See id. at 230-31. Katz and Page have attempted to debunk the
legal import of the shareholder wealth maximization norm by analyzing case law surrounding the duty
of care, the business judgment rule, and constituency statutes. Id. at 231-33, 236. Katz and Page also
present a myriad of anti-takeover defenses that the directors of Ben & Jerry’s could have employed to
halt the sale of the company to Unilever. Id. at 233-35; see also Kerr, supra note 21, at 634 (arguing that
90
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was able to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituents—including its
employees, creditors, suppliers, the community, and the environment—when it
considered bids91 because Vermont corporate law contains a constituency statute
allowing such considerations.92 Indeed, Unilever still continues some, if not all, of

“judicial action and recent shareholder constituency statutes have opened the door to allow directors
of public companies to take non-shareholder interests and concerns into consideration when making
investment decisions”).
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement Under Section 14(d)(4) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14D-9) (Apr. 18, 2000), at 14-15 (referencing the
factors that caused the board to approve the sale, including the acquirer’s “commitment to sign on,
enthusiastically, to pursue and expand the social mission of the Company,” the acquirer’s
commitment to continue to fund the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation, and the effects of the merger on local
Vermont communities, suppliers, and franchisees).
91

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30 (West 2012). The Vermont legislature amended its business law
statute in 1998 to add a constituency statute, partly in anticipation of the Ben & Jerry’s sale. See Page
& Katz, supra note 2, at 236. The pertinent part of the amendment reads:
92

In determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation, a director of a corporation which has a class of voting stock
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as the same
may be amended from time to time, may, in addition, consider the interests of the
corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the
state, region and nation, community and societal considerations, including those of
any community in which any offices or facilities of the corporation are located, and
any other factors the director in his or her discretion reasonably considers
appropriate in determining what he or she reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and the long-term and short-term interests of the
corporation and its stockholders, and including the possibility that these interests
may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation . . . .
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30 (West 2012) (footnote omitted).
In 2000, during the months surrounding Ben & Jerry’s negotiations with Unilever, the
Vermont Office of the Attorney General was asked to issue an Informal Opinion regarding how this
amendment changed the standard of conduct for corporate directors. See 2000 VT. ATT’Y. GEN.
INFORMAL OP. 2000-2, 2000 WL 34416663, at *1-3. In its opinion, the Office of the Attorney
General acknowledged that the Vermont Supreme Court had not addressed the statutory duty of care,
“either prior or subsequent to the [constituency statute] amendment,” and that “[t]he absence of
Vermont law on the subject makes it difficult to determine what effect the amendment has on the
obligations of corporate directors.” Id. at *1. The opinion looked to relevant cases and American Bar
Association commentary on constituency statutes to opine that the statute was likely meant “as a
response to, and in effect an abrogation of, the Revlon decision,” thereby allowing directors to consider
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Ben & Jerry’s social and environmental missions eleven years after the change in
control.93 However, some state corporate laws do not contain constituency
statutes.94 Vermont adopted its own constituency statute shortly before the Ben &
Jerry’s acquisition in an attempt to preempt the acquisition and the application of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm because of the potential loss of business and
jobs in Vermont.95
Where a constituency statute is not available and the shareholder wealth
maximization norm is applied, risk-averse directors of a social enterprise—fearing
liability for a breach of fiduciary duties—may feel obligated to recommend an
acquisition by an entity that intends to scale back or even abandon the social or
environmental mission of the social enterprise.96
B. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
Scholars and courts express a director’s fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of a corporation as a duty to prioritize the shareholders’ interests over
interests of other constituencies or to maximize shareholder wealth.97 A frequently
the interests of constituents other than shareholders “under all circumstances, including the
circumstance in which a decision has been made to sell.” Id. at *3.
93

Page and Katz, supra note 2, at 244-45.

Kerr, supra note 21, at 637-38. Constituency statutes were promulgated in many states in the 1980s
to protect local corporations in response to increased out-of-state takeover activity. See id. Generally,
a constituency statute allows directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies
when making business decisions for the corporation. Id. Non-shareholder constituencies include
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and the communities where the corporation is situated or
does business; the national, state, and local economies; both the long-term and short-term interests of
shareholders and the corporation; other community and societal factors. Anthony Bisconti, Note, The
Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 782 (2008). Except for Connecticut’s constituency statute, constituency
statutes are permissive—directors do not have to consider non-shareholder constituents and factors
in their decision-making and non-shareholder constituents do not have a legally enforceable right to
enforce their interests. Id. at 783.
94

95

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.

96

See id.

97ABA

Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 30, at 2265 (stating that “the ‘best interests of the
corporation’ are equated with ‘corporate profit and shareholder gain’”). The Model Business
Corporation Act codifies the duty of care as a standard of liability for directors, requiring that
directors act in good faith, with a reasonable belief that their decisions and actions are in the best
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cited case espousing the shareholder wealth maximization norm is Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., in which the Michigan Supreme Court ordered Henry Ford to pay dividends to
Ford shareholders out of significant earnings that Ford had wanted to use for price
reductions to benefit the public.98 Although the holding of the case was not based
on the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the Michigan Supreme Court stated
that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”99
Similarly, scholars have extolled the virtues of the shareholder wealth maximization
norm. In his famous defense of the norm, Milton Friedman posits that directors are
employees of the shareholders and, as such, should prioritize their interests:
In a free enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is
an employe[e] of the owners of the business. He has [a] direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules
of the society . . . .100
Professor Bainbridge has justified the shareholder wealth maximization norm
in different terms.101 Bainbridge argues that wealth maximization is “the only
common denominator” amongst shareholders.102 That is, although shareholders may
have varied interests (as in the case of socially responsible investors), a significant
purpose of investing is to maximize one’s own wealth.103 Wealth maximization is the

interests of the corporation, and that they remain appropriately informed under the circumstances.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) (2010).
98

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683-85 (Mich. 1919).

99

Id. at 684.

Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine- The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
100

See Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, supra note 20, at 1427-28; see
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002)
(arguing that corporate law operates under a “director primacy” norm, whereby directors, and not
shareholders, are the decision-makers of the corporation).
101

102

Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, supra note 20, at 1433 n.35.

103

Id.
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only “common goal” “[i]n a large and diverse shareholder community.”104
Bainbridge further argues that the cost of equity capital will rise if directors are
allowed to pursue interests other than shareholders’ interests.105 Allowing directors
to take non-shareholder interests into account creates more risk for shareholders, but
that risk is not reflected in shareholders’ rate of return; shareholders will, therefore,
invest stock elsewhere or monitor management more closely, causing the cost of
equity to rise.106
Although the shareholder wealth maximization norm has been fundamental
to the normative constructs of corporate law, there is debate as to whether it
accurately describes the current state of corporate law. On one hand, some scholars
claim that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is rarely espoused in case
law.107 These scholars argue that the shareholder wealth maximization norm flies in
the face of (i) the business judgment rule, (ii) constituency statutes that allow
directors to consider the interests of non-shareholders, and (iii) statutory provisions
that protect directors from personal liability to the corporation and its shareholders,

104

Id.

105

Id. at 1433.

See id. at 1433. Bainbridge’s view (i) fails to acknowledge that social and environmental returns are a
measurable, common goal of social investors and (ii) fails to take into account the likelihood that a
corporation will face increased costs if it ignores non-economic interests. See Porter & Kramer, supra
note 13, at 5 (acknowledging “social harms or weaknesses frequently create internal costs for firms—
such as wasted energy or raw materials, costly accidents, and the need for remedial training to
compensate for inadequacies in education”); Moran, supra note 35, at B5 (quoting Wes Selke, an
investment manager at a social-impact venture capital firm, who observed that “‘more people [are]
taking interest in investing in companies that are doing the right thing right from the start’”).
106

See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV 163, 171
(2008) (confirming that except for Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware
courts have “never actually sanction[ed] directors for failing to maximize shareholder wealth”); see also
WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
298 (3d ed. 2009) (observing “Dodge . . . is one of few decisions by a U.S. court to enforce shareholder
primacy as a rule of law. Moreover, it is an old opinion.”); Green, supra note 20 at 1411-12 (stating
that generally constituency statutes “represent little more than codifications of the business judgment
rule as it has recently been interpreted by the Delaware courts”); Page & Katz, supra note 2, at 232
(observing that “[t]he rhetoric of shareholder wealth maximization . . . has produced almost no legal
results”).
107
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such as Delaware Code Annotated section 102(b)(7).108 On the other hand, there are
those who, like Bainbridge, claim that the norm remains fundamental to positive law:
[T]he mainstream of corporate law remains committed to the
principles espoused by the Dodge court. By mainstream I refer of
course to Delaware’s courts and legislature which are still our premier
corporate lawmakers. As it has long done, Delaware law still requires
directors to put shareholder interests ahead of those of
nonshareholders. At least in Delaware, the shareholder wealth
maximization norm thus remains a more accurate description of the
state of the law than any of its competitors.109

108 See Kerr, supra note 21, at 634 (arguing that “judicial action and recent shareholder constituency
statutes have opened the door to allow directors of public companies to take non-shareholder
interests and concerns into consideration when making investment decisions”); Page & Katz, supra
note 2, at 232; Stout, supra note 107, at 166, 171 (arguing that Dodge v. Ford is “bad law” because
“judges routinely refuse to impose any legal obligation on corporate directors to maximize
shareholder wealth”).

Professor Lubben and Alana Darnell write about “the waning of the duty of care.” Stephen
J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2006). Through
analysis of Delaware case law, they show that the duty of care “now requires little more of a director
than a ritualistic consideration of relevant data. Today, after the director engages in this ritual, her
decision will not violate the duty.” Id.; see, e.g., Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts,
supra note 101, at 6-7 (making the normative argument for the erosion of the duty of care with his
theory of “director primacy”).
This erosion of the duty of care is due largely to the business judgment rule and Section
102(b)(7)-type charter provisions that exculpate directors from any monetary liability arising from
duty of care claims. The business judgment rule stands for the premise that courts will not secondguess good faith decisions made by independent and disinterested directors. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). The courts, therefore, defer greatly to corporate boards in
their decision-making so long as a rational process was employed and there are no claims of bad faith
or self-dealing (i.e. a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty). See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative
Litig. 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, supra note 20, at 1423-25; see also
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 30, at 2261 (stating its opinion that “the Delaware
courts have stated the prevailing corporate common law in this country: directors have fiduciary
responsibilities to shareholders which, while allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of
others, compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term interests of shareholders
when so doing”).
109
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As this debate continues, it is generally agreed that there is still one area of law where
the shareholder wealth maximization norm is clearly implicated—in the context of a
sale or change in control transaction.110
C. The Revlon Rule
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Delaware affirmed the shareholder wealth maximization norm by holding that during
an inevitable sale or dissolution of a company, the directors of the target corporation
must allow market forces to “operate freely to bring the target’s shareholders the
best price available for their equity.”111 Revlon faced a hostile takeover offer from
Pantry Pride, Inc. and sought a friendly bidder in Forstmann Little & Co.112 The
Revlon board planned several defensive measures to thwart Pantry Pride’s tender
offers, including the purchase of 10 million shares by Revlon in exchange for senior
subordinated notes containing “covenants which limited Revlon’s ability to incur
additional debt, sell assets, or pay dividends unless otherwise approved by the
‘independent’ (non-management) members of the board.”113 The Revlon board later
approved Forstmann’s proposal, in part, to protect the noteholders, who had
threatened to sue the directors when the value of the notes fell upon announcement
that the covenants in the notes would be waived.114 The share price of Forstmann
and Pantry Pride’s offers were relatively similar, but Revlon favored Forstmann,
partially because (i) Pantry Pride’s chairman and CEO, Ronald Perelman, had a
reputation for acquiring companies through junk bond investments and (ii) Pantry
Pride intended to break up Revlon and dispose of its assets.115 The Delaware
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that
when Revlon was for sale, ‘[t]he duty of the board . . . changed from the preservation of Revlon as a
corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”);
see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Achieving the Double Bottom Line: A Framework for Corporations Seeking to Deliver
Profits and Public Services, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 219 (stating it is “[o]nly in limited situations
where directors contemplate the break-up of the corporation or institute a sale of the corporate
enterprise do courts require directors to focus solely on profit maximization”).
110

111

Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.

112

Id. at 176-79.

113

Id. at 177.

114

Id. at 178-79.

Id. at 176-77 (citing Revlon CEO Michael Bergerac’s “strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman”
and Pantry Pride’s strategy to acquire Revlon through junk bond financing).
115
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Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s ruling that “the Revlon directors
had breached their duty of loyalty by making concessions to Forstmann, out of
concern for their liability to the noteholders, rather than maximizing the sale price of
the company for the stockholders’ benefit.”116 The court held:
A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing
to the stockholders. However, such concern for non-stockholder
interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in
progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.117
Notably, the court reasoned that by seeking a friendly bidder and authorizing
negotiation of a merger with Forstmann after Pantry Pride’s initial hostile tender
offer, the Revlon board had put the corporation up for sale.118 Once Revlon’s sale
became inevitable, defensive tactics used to promote bidding and bring shareholders
a higher share price were permissible, but the directors’ breached their duty of loyalty
when employing defensive tactics for the purpose of ending further bidding.119 The
Revlon rule dictates that, once a company is up for sale, directors cannot favor a
particular acquirer over the other while engaged in an active bidding process.120
Rather, the “board’s primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for
selling the company to the highest bidder.”121 Once in Revlon mode, the merger
transaction and board’s decision-making process face heightened scrutiny when
challenged in court.122

116

Id. at 179.

117

Id. at 182 (citation omitted).

118

Id.

Id. at 183 (“[W]hile those lock-ups which draw bidders into the battle benefit shareholders, similar
measures which end an active auction and foreclose further bidding operate to the shareholders’
detriment.”).
119

120

Id. at 184.

121

Id.

Id. California has yet to consider a case where it might follow Delaware’s Revlon rule. California
state courts have only cited the Revlon case in two opinions, one published and one unpublished. In
2008, the California Court of Appeals considered application of the Revlon rule in a case involving a
breach of fiduciary duty claim because the internal affairs doctrine required application of Delaware
122
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Subsequent Delaware cases made clear that the Revlon rule does not apply to
all corporate acquisitions, and, therefore, a target board can attempt to structure its
transaction to avoid such duties. For instance, Revlon duties are not triggered in
stock-for-stock mergers in which a majority of shares in the surviving entity will be
held by a “fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting
majority” because the target shareholders’ control premium will survive the
merger.123 However, where a shareholder or group of shareholders will hold a
controlling block of stock in the resulting entity, Delaware courts have held that
Revlon duties are triggered.124 In a transcript ruling, the Delaware Chancery Court
suggested that the Revlon rule would apply even in a merger where the consideration
is a mix of cash and stock and the target stockholders would obtain a control
premium in the acquirer.125
Very recently, the Delaware Chancery Court extended the Revlon rule to a
merger of two publicly-held corporations, where there was no change in control but
where the shareholders of the target company received an even mix of cash and
stock as consideration for their shares, stating that the transaction deprived the
stockholders of their investment’s “long-run potential.”126 This case seems to have

law, and California law was not implicated. See Greenspan v. Intermix Media, Inc., No. B196434,
2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 8343, at *25, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2008). In Kirschner Brothers Oil, Inc. v.
Natomas Co., the California Court of Appeals cited the Revlon case as authority for the premise that
protection of noteholders at the expense of shareholders is inconsistent with a “board’s duty to its
equity shareholders to maximize the sale price of the company.” 229 Cal. Rptr. 899, 907 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986). Nonetheless, the facts of Kirschner did not implicate the Revlon rule per se. The Kirschner court
refused to find that fiduciary duty requires directors to preserve the stock value of preferred
shareholders because their conversion rights are contractually based, as were the rights of the
noteholders in Revlon. Id. at 908.
123

Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1989).

124

See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43-44 (Del. 1994).

See Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, No. 5878-VCL, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6,
2012).

125

See In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, at
*45-60 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011). According to William Savitt:

126

The Smurfit-Stone decision suggests that deal planners should expect that any merger
including a significant amount of cash consideration is likely to be subject to
“intermediate” judicial review under Revlon. At the same time, the decision
confirms that Delaware continues to afford informed and well-advised independent
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enlarged the circumstances under which the Revlon rule is triggered, although the
court acknowledged that the Delaware Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.127
This uncertainty continues to feed into the risk-aversion of directors and corporate
managers as they contemplate acquisitions:
A fair statement of current [Delaware takeover] doctrine is that a
board sells “control,” and thus triggers Revlon duties to seek the
highest price and be rigorously fair between competing bidders, when
it agrees to exchange a controlling stake in the company, either for
cash or non-voting securities, or for voting shares in an acquirer with
a controlling shareholder but not when it exchanges 100% of its
voting shares for voting shares in a widely held acquirer, most
commonly through a stock-for-stock merger. (Whether Revlon
applies to the remaining possibility, exchange of a less than 100%
stake for a widely held acquirer’s voting shares, isn’t clear.)128
When Revlon is triggered is important to the future of many social enterprises,
including those social enterprises that incorporate as flexible purpose corporations.
One can imagine many scenarios in which the acquisition of a social enterprise, given
the fact that it is likely a start-up or early stage company, will trigger Revlon duties.
Because a social enterprise is likely to be a small entity (in both size and revenue), any
acquisition by a larger profit-maximizing business will not be a “merger of equals”
and could therefore result in a diminution of target stockholders’ voting power as it
is swallowed by the larger entity, of particular concern to Delaware courts.129 Or the
potential acquirer may cash out all target shareholders and continue operations as a
division of the larger corporation (as was the case with Ben & Jerry’s, Burt’s Bees,

directors wide latitude to customize a merger or sales process in the best interests
of a target company and its stockholders.
Savitt et al., supra note 87.
127

In re Smurfit-Stone, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, at *40.

Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 534-35 (2002); see also Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87
(Del. 1989) (“[F]airness forbids directors from using defensive mechanisms to thwart an auction or to
favor one bidder over another.”).
128

129

See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 45.
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and Tom’s of Maine) or continue the social enterprise’s operations in a whollyowned subsidiary of the acquirer.130
Professors Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman have explained the logic of
the Revlon line of cases as embracing a hidden value theory—that is, Delaware’s
takeover jurisprudence embraces the notion that the firm’s value is visible and
knowable only to its directors and not to shareholders, the stock market, or potential
acquirers.131 Black and Kraakman explain that, starting with Smith v. Van Gorkom,
Delaware takeover jurisprudence asserted the notion that the board of directors must
determine the firm’s intrinsic value and seek that value for the firm’s shareholders in
a change of control transaction.132 “The board cannot rely on shareholder approval
to discharge its duty, nor may it rely principally on prices set by the stock market or
the takeover market. Because others may miss the company’s hidden value, the
board must value the firm itself, preferably with an investment banker’s
assistance.”133 The hidden value theory affirms the Revlon rule’s adherence to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm such that wealth maximization becomes an
exacting standard but also provides well-informed directors with discretion on
structuring an acquisition to achieve that value.134 According to Black and
Kraakman, “language in other cases appears to sanction board consideration of other
concerns,” but “judicial permission to weigh nonshareholder interests is not a license
to ignore shareholder interests; it simply recognizes the broad sweep of the board’s
discretion to decide what actions will maximize long-run shareholder value.”135
Mark Cherry, CO-OPs May Have a Homegrown Advantage, HEALTHLEADERS INTERSTUDY (Dec. 16,
2011, 9:45AM), http://hl-isy.com/Healthcare-Reform-Blog/December-2011/co-op-advantage121611.
130

Black & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 521, 559-60 (rejecting the hidden value model in favor of a
visible value model with changes in control governed by a bilateral decision-making process, but
acknowledging that Delaware courts rely on the hidden value model).
131

132

Id. at 525-26.

133

Black & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 526.

134

Id. at 527.

135 Id. at 527-28 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) for the holdings that a target
board may consider constituencies other than shareholders when implementing takeover defenses).
The Revlon rule has also been supported by a control premium theory—where a target corporation
transfers control to a new controlling shareholder (whether the target corporation previously had a
controlling shareholder or not), the target shareholders (other than the controlling shareholder) must
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THE FLEXIBLE PURPOSE CORPORATION

Responding to the dominance of the shareholder wealth maximization norm
and the desire for corporate law to enable businesses along the social enterprise
spectrum, corporate law scholars and practitioners worked to rethink the corporate
form. The flexible purpose corporation was crafted by the California Working
Group for New Corporate Forms, a group of ten corporate lawyers and law
professors convened in 2008.136 The flexible purpose corporation allows directors
and officers to pursue social and environmental objectives along with shareholders’
economic interests for those corporations that adopt or convert to the form.137
The working group acknowledged the uncertainty of case law surrounding
the shareholder wealth maximization norm as to when a director can be held liable
for actions taken at the expense of shareholder value. First, the working group
argued, the business judgment rule may provide limited protection for directors and
officers who attempt to consider all business decisions in light of both the social
mission and profit motives of the corporation.138 Second, the protection of the
business judgment rule is limited with respect to change of control transactions
where “boards and management generally have a fiduciary duty to act solely in the
interest of maximizing shareholder value.”139 Finally, even if the business judgment
rule would provide liability protection for specific business decisions based on the

be paid for the sale of those control rights; directors must maximize shareholder value to achieve the
control premium for such shareholders. Id. at 535 (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)).
See generally W. Derrick Britt et al, Proposed Amendments to the California Corporations Code for a New
Corporate Form: The Flexible Purpose Corporation and Senate Bill 201 — Frequently Asked Questions (2011)
[hereinafter FPC-FAQ], available at http://businessforgood.blogspot.com/2011/03/frequently-askedquestions-proposed.html.
136

Id. The flexible purpose corporation was proposed as California Senate Bill 201 (“The Corporate
Flexibility Act of 2011”) on February 8, 2011 by Senator DeSaulnier. See The Corporate Flexibility
Act of 2011, S.B. 201, 2011 Gen. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). The Act was approved by Governor Brown
on October 9, 2011 and became effective on January 1, 2012. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2500 (West 2012).

137

138

See FPC-FAQ, supra note 136, at 5.

139

Id.

2012]

CAN AN OLD DOG LEARN NEW TRICKS?

249

dual objectives of the corporation, directors remain risk-averse and take conservative
positions due to the threat of litigation.140 The working group reasoned that:
[b]ecause these rules are judicially created and interpreted, and
because litigation is prevalent, even where judicial guidance exists,
directors and their lawyers tend to apply risk-averse interpretations,
resulting in the practical effect that consideration of "blended value"
seldom succeeds in the boardroom if it threatens the maximization of
short-term or long-term shareholder profitability.141
The flexible purpose corporation is an attempt to break through these
barriers posed by the traditional corporation. Specifically, the flexible purpose
corporation may adopt “at least one ‘Special Purpose’ that directors and managers
may consider in addition to traditional shareholder economic interests when
determining what is in the best interests of the Flexible Purpose Corporation and its
shareholders with respect to decisions about operations, policies and transactions.”142
These special purposes are:
(A)

One or more charitable or public purpose activities that a
nonprofit public benefit corporation is authorized to carry out.

(B)

The purpose of promoting positive short-term or long-term
effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term
effects of, the flexible purpose corporation’s activities upon
any of the following:
(i)

140

The flexible purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers,
customers, and creditors.

Id.; see also Bisconti, supra note 94, at 793-94 (stating that:
[T]here is no legal authority protecting a board that rejects a higher value bid out of
consideration for nonshareholder interests. Instead, Revlon and its far-reaching
precedent provide authority for punishing management for not accepting the
higher bid. Since constituency statutes are merely permissive and lack an
enforcement mechanism, they do little more than give boards the legislative
permission to consider the effects of an acquisition on nonshareholder
constituencies. Consequently, a board can disregard these interests without fearing
shareholder backlash.).

141

FPC-FAQ, supra note 136, at 5.

142

Id. at 6.
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(ii) The community and society.
(iii) The environment.143
The flexible purpose corporation does not take a redistributive approach.
That is, directors of the corporation do not have fiduciary duties to non-shareholders
and there is no private right of action against directors by non-shareholder
constituents.144 Non-shareholder constituents have other means of protecting
themselves and expressing their interests—i.e., through contracting with the firm.145
By giving only shareholders a private right of action, the flexible purpose corporation
statute fully embraces the shareholder primacy norm but acknowledges that
shareholders’ interests are more than just financial, as will be discussed in Part V.146
At the same time, the statement of special purpose in the corporate charter puts the
world and investors on notice that both financial and non-economic values will be
pursued.147
V.

REJECTING WEALTH MAXIMIZATION BUT EMBRACING SHAREHOLDER
PRIMACY

Given the legislative history and purpose of the flexible purpose corporation,
it is clear that California courts should not apply a Revlon-type rule to directors of
flexible purpose corporations engaging in sale or change of control transactions so
far as the Revlon rule requires directors to obtain the best price reasonably attainable
at the expense of the special purposes outlined in a flexible purpose corporation’s
charter.148 In addition to the legislative history, my basis for rejecting the shareholder
wealth maximization norm but embracing shareholder primacy flows from the nexus
of contract theory of corporate law.
143

CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2012).

144

See Bisconti, supra note 94, at 783.

145

See id. at 800.

146

See infra Part V.

The working group designed the flexible purpose corporation with this notice in mind: “Rather,
the Special Purpose requirement is designed to put shareholders and potential shareholders on notice
that the corporation will pursue agreed interests that may (or may not) align with profit maximization,
depending upon the business judgment of the directors, taking into account the Special Purpose.”
FPC-FAQ, supra note 136, at 7.
147

148

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986).
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A. A New Norm For Impact and Social Investors
The nexus of contract theory has widespread support amongst corporate law
scholars.149 Under the nexus of contract theory, “the corporation is properly
understood as a legal fiction representing the nexus of a set of contracts among the
multiple factors of production provided by the organization’s various
constituencies.”150 The corporation brings together the complex and conflicting
interests of its constituents,151 which include not only its suppliers, employees,
creditors, and management, but also its shareholders, as providers of capital.152 Just
as suppliers and employees enter into supply and employment agreements with the
firm, the shareholders’ contractual relationship with the firm is set forth in the firm’s
organizational documents and the corporate laws (common law and statute) of the
state of the firm’s incorporation.153 Shareholders have a residual and contractual

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (stating that:
149

The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without
permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has
little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and
other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular
sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what the
consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by
changes exogenous to the organization.).
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769,
777 (2006); see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 149, at 311.

150

151

Jensen & Meckling, supra note 149, at 311 (asserting that:
The firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex
process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may
“represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework
of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the firm is like the behavior
of a market, that is, the outcome of a complex equilibrium process.).

See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 14, 21 (1992).
152

Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule, Corporate
Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 916-17 (1996) (describing the
history of corporate law theory and its effects on shareholder voting).

153
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claim on the corporation’s assets.154 According to contractarians, the “principal right
that flows from the shareholders’ status as the corporation’s residual claimants” is
the shareholder wealth maximization norm.155 If the contractarian view of corporate
law is to be accepted, then corporate law becomes a default set of rules for the
standardized form contract that reduces bargaining costs and facilitates private
ordering.156 There is “no inherently correct, natural, or logical” rule derived from the
nexus of contracts theory other than those that are created from the bargaining
amongst the corporation’s constituents.157 Therefore, that the shareholder wealth
maximization norm flows from shareholders’ status as the corporation’s residual
claimants is not an inherent or natural rule but a normative decision resulting from
bargaining amongst constituents that can be changed depending on the shareholders’
preferences and priorities.158
Defenders of the shareholder wealth maximization norm assert that either (i)
shareholders do not derive any utility from their investments other than through
pecuniary interests or (ii) shareholders’ non-pecuniary interests are diverse and
immeasurable.159 This assertion cannot stand, as applied to the flexible purpose
corporation and the type of investor that a flexible purpose corporation is likely to
attract—impact investors and social investors.160 Although flexible purpose
corporations are free to seek and receive capital investment from traditional
investors, the flexible purpose corporation is likely to attract impact and social
investors, including sustainable and responsible investing funds (which use
environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) criteria to vet investment
activities),161 venture philanthropy firms (which pool funds and distribute them to
154

Bainbridge, Unocal at 20, supra note 150, at 777.

155

Id.

Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, supra note 20, at 1428; see also
King, supra note 153, at 917 (describing corporate law as “enabling legislation . . . subject to bargaining
and revision by the contracting parties themselves”).

156

157

King, supra note 153, at 917.

158

See id.

159

See Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 509, 545 (2011).

160

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

161 According to a report by the US SIF Foundation, $80.9 billion was invested by 375 sustainable and
responsible investment funds in the beginning of 2011, representing a 15.9% increase from 2010. US
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social enterprises),162 and, depending on the business model, private foundations
(which make mission-related investments and socially responsible investments).163
Impact investors seek to make investments that create positive impacts and
social and environmental benefits beyond financial returns.164 The definition of
“social investor” varies, but some distinguish social investors from impact investors
and limit the term to investors who seek to minimize the negative social and
environmental impacts of their investments, as opposed to creating social and
environmental benefits.165 Others would label social investors as investors who make
investment decisions based wholly or in part on non-financial considerations.166 This
is not to say that impact or social investors wholly subordinate their profit-making
SIF, Study: “Alternative Investment” Assets in Sustainable & Responsible Investing Jumped 16 Percent in 2010
(Oct. 26, 2011), http://ussif.org/news/releases/pressrelease.cfm?id=181. US SIF Foundation is a
non-profit 501(c)(3) organization that supports the research and educational activities of US SIF –
The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment. See generally US SIF, http://ussif.org (last
visited Mar. 15, 2012).
162

LANE, supra note 47, at 188 (stating that:
Venture philanthropy distinguishes itself by:
•

its willingness to invest in start-up social enterprises with new approaches
to solving social problems;

•

its focus on measurable result (i.e., measuring the social impact of a target
enterprise);

•

its readiness to shift funds between organizations and goals based on the
tracking of measurable results; and

•

the high involvement of the venture philanthropy firm in the affairs of the
target enterprise.).

Lane lists about 50 such venture philanthropy firms. See id.
Robert A. Wexler & David A. Levitt, Using New Hybrid Legal Forms: Three Case Studies, Four Important
Questions, and a Bunch of Analysis, 69 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 63, 63 (2012).

163

For an evaluation of the impact investment market, see generally J.P.MORGAN, Impact Investments:
An Emerging Asset Class (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer/
impact_investments_nov2010.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1158611333228&blobheader=application
%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
164

See generally Timothy Smith, Institutional Investors Find Common Ground with Social Investors, 1622 P.L.I.
CORP. 283 (2007) (discussing various motives of social investors and shareholders).
165

166

See generally id.
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preferences to the achievement of social and environmental results; many impact and
social investors expect to realize financial returns equal to those of traditional
investments, although many also expect to make less.167 And yet, the expectation
that impact or social investments achieve results equal to those of traditional
investments should not be confused with the shareholder wealth maximization
norm. Impact and social investors’ do not always expect the directors and officers to
pursue such profits at the expense of social and environmental value creation.168
Arguably, the preferences of impact or social investors differ from those of
traditional profit-maximizing investors, and, thus, impact and social investors should
be able to bargain for a norm that differs from wealth maximization.169 How do we
know that the flexible purpose corporation incorporates the right set of default rules
that impact and social investors would otherwise bargain for on their own? To
answer that question, we must look to empirical evidence. The amount of capital
flowing into flexible purpose corporations will provide evidence as to whether the
flexible purpose corporation statute has chosen the right set of default rules.
Because shareholders who invest in a flexible purpose corporation are put on notice
that the flexible purpose corporation is fundamentally different than a traditional
profit-maximizing corporation, the flexible purpose corporation will attract
shareholders who accept this modified contract.170 Those shareholders are impact
and social investors willing to optimize profits and social and environmental

Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 558,
573-74 (2006).
167

168

See generally id.

169

See generally Smith, supra note 165.

170

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2012).
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benefits.171 Unlike a constituency statute that applies to all corporations in the state
where such a statute has been adopted, shareholders have to opt-in to the special
purpose of a flexible purpose corporation by either purchasing stock in a flexible
purpose corporation or by voting their shares in favor of converting an existing
traditional corporation into a flexible purpose corporation.172 Measurement of the
extent to which investments flow into a flexible purpose corporation will provide
evidence that social investors are prepared to displace the shareholder wealth
maximization norm and accept a new norm for understanding shareholder value that
incorporates social and environmental value.173 Notably, we can compare the
amount of capital flowing into flexible purpose corporations with the amount of
investment in another corporate form that enables social enterprise—the benefit
corporation.174 Collection of empirical evidence in addition to a comparison with the
In support of the flexible purpose corporation legislation, the Corporations Committee of the State
Bar of California recognized the need to accommodate impact and social investors’ economic and
non-economic interests through new default rules for flexible purpose corporations:

171

In response to investor demand and the expressed desires of the California
Legislature, we support providing consenting business owners a vehicle to structure
their business affairs in a novel way to achieve their multiple purposes. We
appreciate that some business owners desire their businesses to achieve some
higher good, in addition to doing well. We think it is important that California law
provide business owners and organizers flexibility to achieve their goals, provided
that shareholders are adequately protected by procedural safeguards.
Letter from The Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California
to The Honorable Juan Vargas, Chair of the Senate Committee on Banking and Financial Institutions
(Mar. 25, 2011) (on file with author).
172

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2012).

Nonetheless, the flexible purpose corporation statute became effective January 2012, and I
concede that gathering empirical evidence of social investors’ investment in this new corporate form
will take time as social entrepreneurs begin to incorporate their social ventures as flexible purpose
corporations. Moreover, the flexible purpose corporation has only been adopted in one state thus far,
whereas the benefit corporation is available in several states—in measuring the capital flow into these
forms one would need to control for this fact, possibly by just comparing the capital flow in
California which has both the flexible purpose corporation and the benefit corporation.
173

See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Notably, Patagonia, a well-known and privately-held
outdoor clothing and gear company, was among the first California corporations to convert to a
benefit corporation in January 2012. Patagonia owner and founder Yvon Chouniard cited the ability
to maintain Patagonia’s environmental mission despite changes in ownership as a reason for
Patagonia’s conversion. See Marc Lifsher, Businesses Seek State’s New ‘Benefit Corporation’ Status, L.A.

174
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benefit corporation will assist scholars and practitioners in understanding the merit
of flexible purpose corporations.
B. Measuring the Best Interests of the Corporation
To the extent that flexible purpose corporation investors have non-economic
interests, their interests must be advanced along with the shareholders’ financial
interests in order to uphold shareholder primacy.175 Pursuit of economic interests
and the special purpose should define the new meaning of “best interests of the . . .
corporation” with respect to flexible purpose corporations.176 Advancement of the
special purpose should be measured and reported the same way that financial returns
are—i.e., with accounting methods that monetize and report results relative to
costs.177 In 2004, the Research Initiative on Social Entrepreneurship (“RISE”), with
funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and Columbia Business School,
documented and evaluated the effect of social impact accounting on corporations,
social ventures, non-profits, foundations, and investors.178 RISE found that although
no standard measure for social impact accounting yet exists, best practices have
emerged.179 Two commonly used methods are Social Return on Investment (SROI)
and benefit-cost analysis.180 RISE aimed its report at institutional social investors
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and social entrepreneurs, helping them “create a set of output indicators that can be
tracked relatively easily over time.”181 Likewise, the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board, a U.S.-based non-profit organization, is creating standard social
accounting tools in the same manner that the Financial Accounting Standards Board
created standards for financial accounting.182 As the various methods of assessing
social impact continue to develop and firms begin reporting them as they would
financial results, investors will be able to demonstrate to boards (with their wallets)
the value of common and measurable social and environmental interests.183
Moreover, boards may be able to use social impact accounting standards in their
evaluations of whether to pursue a sale or change of control transaction.184
VI.

A GAP IN DIRECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY

The rejection of the shareholder wealth maximization norm for flexible
purpose corporations facing a sale or change of control transaction triggering Revlon
duties causes significant problems, the most notable of which is the creation of a gap
in directors’ accountability to shareholders.
A. The Problem of “Sell-Out” or Mission-Drift
Assume that courts do not apply the shareholder wealth maximization norm
to flexible purpose corporations engaging in a sale or change of control transaction,
given (i) rejection of the norm in the flexible purpose corporation statute,185 and (ii)
adherence to shareholder primacy where shareholders are expected to be social and
impact investors with both economic and non-economic motives.186 The absence of
internal rate of return (the net value of revenues plus impacts expressed as an
annual percentage return on the total costs of the investment[)].).
Social return on investment (SROI) was pioneered by REDF, one of the earliest U.S.-based venture
philanthropy firms. For the six-step approach to measuring SROI, see REDF, supra note 177, at 7.
181

CLARK ET AL., supra note 178, at 5.

SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., http://sasb.org/thank-you.html (last visited May 1,
2012).
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the shareholder wealth maximization norm leaves a gap in director accountability to
shareholders when engaged in a sale or change of control transaction.187 This is
because the directors’ responsibility to consider the special purpose of the flexible
purpose corporation is permissive and not mandatory.188 The pertinent part of the
statute reads:
In discharging his or her duties, a director may consider . . . factors,
and give weight to those factors, as the director deems relevant,
including the short-term and long-term prospects of the flexible
purpose corporation, the best interests of the flexible purpose
corporation and its shareholders, and the purposes of the flexible
purpose corporation as set forth in its articles.189
While this provision may give directors the necessary discretion to oversee and
manage the flexible purpose corporation, it enables the possibility of “sell-out” or
mission-drift—i.e., prioritizing shareholder gain at the expense of the social or
environmental mission of the firm.190 For instance, many claimed that Ben and
Jerry’s founders Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield “sold out” in Unilever’s acquisition
of Ben and Jerry’s.191
The statutory language makes clear that directors are free to wholly ignore
the special purpose when making decisions, including those decisions involving a sale
or change of control.192 If a shareholder attempts to bring a derivative suit against
directors for failing to consider the special purpose under such circumstances, the
court could dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, apply the business judgment
rule, or look to the section 102(b)(7) charter provision to exculpate the directors.193
The court might also apply the “entire fairness” standard, particularly if the
transaction was approved by the shareholders. Under this standard, a director may
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show that the transaction was “entirely fair” without regard to the special purpose of
the flexible purpose corporation.194
B. Filling the Gap Through Shareholder Voting Rights & Contract
When creating the flexible purpose corporation, the working group
recognized the possibility of this subversion of the corporation’s special purposes:
[T]he traditional corporate form presents risks for the entrepreneur
seeking to maintain the mission of a Special Purpose during the life
of an early-stage corporation, without the possibility or probability
that investors will shift the company away from the original Special
Purpose over time (particularly at the time of a change of control), in
favor of additional profitability instead. This difficulty in “anchoring
the mission” represents a significant issue for entrepreneurs utilizing
a blended value model.195
The working group attempted to address the issues of mission-drift and sell-out.
First, the flexible purpose corporation statute requires that the corporation maintain
transparency by reporting its efforts to achieve the special purpose through an
annual report.196 Directors must “disclose publicly information regarding objectives,
goals, measurement and reporting of the impact or ‘returns’ of actions vis-à-vis such
Flexible Purpose Corporation’s Special Purposes.”197 This increased transparency is
meant to give shareholders the ability to hold the flexible purpose corporation’s
directors and officers accountable for their actions to further the flexible purpose
corporation’s special purpose, just as financial reporting and disclosures act as an
accountability tool for financial results.198 Presumably, armed with this information,
dissatisfied shareholders can attempt to vote out the board or exit the firm
themselves by selling their shares.199 Both voting and exit are typical corporate

194
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accountability mechanisms.200 Nonetheless, shareholder voting as an accountability
mechanism is less plausible where a founder or group of early investors controls the
board or where the collective action problem exists, and exit becomes problematic
when a market for start-up or early-stage company’s shares does not exist.
Second, a supermajority (i.e., two-thirds) vote is required to merge with or
convert to a traditional corporation or to materially alter the special purpose in the
articles of incorporation of a flexible purpose corporation.201 Shareholders can
simply reject a proposed acquisition that does not further the special purpose of the
flexible purpose corporation, or if the controlling shareholder holds two-thirds of
the shares, the minority shareholders can rely on dissenters’ rights for compensation
for their shares.202 The supermajority vote requirement, thus, is as strong an
accountability mechanism as plausible under the traditional framework of corporate
law.203
Contractual and market mechanisms also exist to fill the accountability gap
and deter mission drift and sell-out. For example, to facilitate the continuance of
Ben & Jerry’s social and environmental mission upon Unilever’s acquisition, Ben &
Jerry’s retained ownership in the company’s trademark for ten years post-acquisition
and licensed it to Unilever on the condition that Unilever continue Ben & Jerry’s
social mission and consult the founders on ways to integrate that mission with the
production of Ben & Jerry’s ice cream.204
However, the inquiry into directors’ accountability should not stop with
contractual mechanisms and shareholder voting, despite their obvious utility. To the
extent that the flexible purpose corporation is an attempt to provide social investors
and entrepreneurs with an off-the-shelf corporate form, default rules could be used
to reduce the agency costs associated with deal-specific contractual provisions.205
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Moreover, Ben & Jerry’s was a well-established brand that was able to insist on the
trademark licensing arrangement.206 Other social enterprises may not have the same
bargaining power to make such contractual arrangements.
As for supermajority voting, shareholder approval does not discharge
directors’ fiduciary duties.207 Shareholder ratification alters a court’s standard of
review of the directors’ actions, moving from the business judgment rule to an
“entire fairness” standard.208 Additionally, in an active bidding situation, it is just as
likely that the merger proposal will not make it to a shareholder vote without
litigation; the bidding parties may seek a preliminary injunction prior to the
shareholder vote, and courts will have to interpret the fiduciary duties of the
directors of the flexible purpose corporation without regard to shareholder approval
(this was the case in Revlon and the subsequent cases that attempted to clarify the
Revlon rule).209 Therefore, while supermajority shareholder approval and contractual
mechanisms certainly mitigate the accountability gap left by rejecting the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, accountability through fiduciary duty should still be
explored.
C. Filling the Gap Through Fiduciary Duty
While directors must be given the necessary deference to exercise their
decision-making authority, they must also be held accountable for their actions to
advance both the profit motives and special purpose of the flexible purpose
corporation in order to avoid sell-out or mission drift.210 Shareholder primacy
warrants that directors’ interests should be aligned with shareholder interests. 211
206
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Moreover, this author predicts that social investors will not invest in a corporate
form that does not protect against the possibility of mission-drift or sell-out.
To fill the gap in director accountability to shareholders of a flexible purpose
corporation, a court could point to corporate law’s long-established tradition of
shareholder primacy, particularly upholding the shareholders’ economic and, now,
non-economic interests.212 In doing so, courts might employ Revlon-like heightened
or “intermediate” scrutiny to directors’ decisions involving a corporate acquisition,
given the ineffectiveness that the business judgment rule would have in protecting
shareholders’ dual interests.213 Under the Revlon analysis, a court will not look solely
to the share price to determine whether a board’s decision was reasonable.214
Instead, the court will use a heightened standard of review that requires additional
scrutiny of the board’s decision-making process.215 The court will ask: Did the
directors engage in a decision-making process that indicates they garnered the best
value possible for their shareholders?216 Under Revlon, the court will determine (i)
whether the board engaged in arms-length decision-making, (ii) whether the merger
agreement included coercive deal protections that preclude other potential acquirers,
and (iii) what information the board relied on to remain well-informed and welladvised about the acquisition, often including an inquiry into whether the target
company engaged in a market check for other potential acquirers or engaged an
investment bank to prepare a fairness opinion.217
212
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A similar fiduciary analysis might be used in director liability suits
surrounding corporate acquisitions of a flexible purpose corporation. Courts would
look at the board’s decision-making process and information that it relied upon to
remain well-advised and well-informed about the acquisition and the firm’s value,
which includes the firm’s ability to create social and environmental value. A court
might inquire whether the social enterprise has engaged in a “market check” or
received a fairness opinion that also considers the special purpose of the corporation.
This “special purpose check” might require the directors to evaluate not only the
target company’s value (in both economic and non-economic terms) but also the
resulting entity’s expected value in non-economic terms using measurements like
social return on investment.
There is utility in relying on social accounting metrics even if they are
subjective and not yet standardized. Reliance on social impact accounting and
measurements is analogous to the fairness opinions that investment bankers provide
boards when public companies are sold.218 Fairness opinions are not entirely
objective.219 To a large extent, fairness opinions rest on the many assumptions made
by the financial advisor.220 Social accounting measurements could be used in the
same way that fairness opinions are used to assure that directors are well-informed
about the firm’s value; social accounting metrics can extend the firm’s valuation to
social and environmental value creation.
A heightened standard of review is not without its problems. Despite its
pomp and circumstance, heightened scrutiny (like the business judgment rule) is still
a process-oriented inquiry that would give directors wide discretion in structuring
mergers and acquisitions.221 Nonetheless, a substantive review of director decisionmaking would be wholly outside the norms of corporate law, for good reason.222
Heightened scrutiny may be the only plausible fiduciary analysis that has more teeth
than the business judgment rule.
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CONCLUSION

“[S]ocial entrepreneurship is reaching its tipping point.”223 Social enterprise
has become (i) the subject of how-to-toolkits for budding entrepreneurs,224 (ii) the
topic of conferences for investors, entrepreneurs, and consultants around the
world,225 (iii) the new buzz word in mainstream media,226 and (iv) the basis of new
programs and institutes at business schools in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.227
The traditional view of the corporation as a profit-maximizing villain is overstated,
but it has contributed to the current backlash228 in the U.S. and elsewhere against
corporations as “[c]ompanies are widely perceived to be prospering at the expense of
the broader community.”229 An avenue has opened for those shareholders who have
both financial and societal interests in mind for their investments—new corporate
forms intended to house and advance social enterprises.230 And yet, these corporate
forms are not viable or sustainable if they do not attract social entrepreneurs or
social investors due to the lack of understanding or inquiry into how traditional
corporate law principles will be applied to these new corporate forms.231 To the
extent that directors are risk-averse, the lack of corporate law precedent is a true
barrier to the proliferation of these new corporate forms.232 This article has
223
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contributed to a necessary discussion and has begun to map out how the shareholder
wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy might be applied. While I plan
to continue this project, I implore others to add their voices to the discussion.

